Today, May 12, residents of Russia are experiencing massive problems accessing mobile internet. According to data from the monitoring service "Sboy.rf," unstable connections are observed in dozens of regions, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Primorsky Krai, as well as Tula, Volgograd, Rostov, Samara, Novosibirsk, and other regions.
Users report that due to the disruptions, they cannot load videos, use search engines, QR codes, or other internet services. Connection speeds drop from 4G to 2G.
The official reason given by authorities is the need to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) controlled via cellular networks. The operational headquarters of Krasnodar Krai explained: "Using high-speed mobile internet, the enemy can control UAVs to carry out terrorist attacks. Therefore, it was decided to restrict access to mobile internet in situations when a 'Drone Danger' signal is received."
Technically, restrictions are imposed locally for the duration of the threat. Home internet and Wi-Fi continue to operate normally.
Notably, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the measures will be extended "as long as additional security measures for citizens are deemednecessary."
For audiences in the CIS, this news is interesting from two perspectives. First, it is a clear illustration of how "digital sovereignty" in action can restrict basic rights. Second — and more importantly from a practical standpoint — none of the Central Asian countries are immune to similar scenarios. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are actively developing cooperation with global digital corporations, may find themselves facing the same choice: security or accessibility.
While there are currently no prerequisites for introducing such measures in the region, the model of internet management demonstrated by Russia sets a precedent.
Users report that due to the disruptions, they cannot load videos, use search engines, QR codes, or other internet services. Connection speeds drop from 4G to 2G.
The official reason given by authorities is the need to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) controlled via cellular networks. The operational headquarters of Krasnodar Krai explained: "Using high-speed mobile internet, the enemy can control UAVs to carry out terrorist attacks. Therefore, it was decided to restrict access to mobile internet in situations when a 'Drone Danger' signal is received."
Technically, restrictions are imposed locally for the duration of the threat. Home internet and Wi-Fi continue to operate normally.
Notably, Russian presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the measures will be extended "as long as additional security measures for citizens are deemednecessary."
For audiences in the CIS, this news is interesting from two perspectives. First, it is a clear illustration of how "digital sovereignty" in action can restrict basic rights. Second — and more importantly from a practical standpoint — none of the Central Asian countries are immune to similar scenarios. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are actively developing cooperation with global digital corporations, may find themselves facing the same choice: security or accessibility.
While there are currently no prerequisites for introducing such measures in the region, the model of internet management demonstrated by Russia sets a precedent.